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Poverty in Middle-Income Countries 
Andy Sumner, IDS, Brighton 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes a shift in the global distribution of poverty from low-income countries (LICs) 
to middle-income countries (MICs) and how the role of external development actors (such as 
‘traditional donors’ – meaning OECD DAC donors and philanthropic foundations and international 
NGOs) – might have to change to meet the challenges that this new distribution of poverty 
represents. The paper argues that, if we accept the proposition that most of the world’s extreme 
poor already live in largely non-poor countries, in order to meet their own objectives of reducing 
poverty, external actors will need to find new configurations of relationships (or they could decide 
poverty in MICs is not their problem and focus on LICs). If they do remain concerned with 
extreme poverty, external actors will need to continue work in the new MICs, because most of the 
world’s poor people live in such countries, but they will need a greater focus on issues of 
equity/inclusion/exclusion; working with advocacy groups and civil society on issues such as 
public spending priorities but with great sensitivity to the politics of doing so and recognising that 
development is very much ‘beyond traditional aid’ (meaning beyond international resource 
transfers). Global Public Goods (GPGs), innovative finance mechanisms and other ‘beyond 
traditional aid’ modalities will be areas where MIC governments, traditional donors and 
philanthropic foundations can work together, and the policy coherence, in areas such as trade, of 
traditional donors will be more important to MIC governments than aid flows. All of this will place 
far more importance on external actors understanding the political dimensions of development. 
 
Introduction 
This paper describes a shift in the global distribution of poverty and how the role of external 
development actors (such as ‘traditional donors’ – meaning donors from OECD countries and 
philanthropic foundations and international NGOs) might have to change to meet the challenges 
that this new distribution of global poverty represents.1  
The basic thesis of the paper is three-fold. First, the paper builds upon data presented in Sumner 
(2010, 2011a, 2011b) and Kanbur and Sumner (2011) which demonstrate that there has been a 
change in the global distribution of poverty from low-income countries to middle-income 
countries.  
Second, the paper argues this shift matters because the allocation and graduation frameworks of 
a number of bilateral and multilateral donors are based on low-income countries and, 
furthermore, there is a ‘conventional wisdom’ that poor people live in poor countries.  
Third, the paper suggests the shift in the distribution of global poverty can be viewed in three 
possible ways. First, it could all be a sleight of hand – the world’s poor people still live in ‘poor’ 
countries, albeit slightly less poor than before. Second, it is ‘business as usual’ because there are 
limits to domestic taxation on the rich and expanding middle classes in developing countries. Or 
third, this shift could mean that a fundamental reframing of global poverty is required, ‘traditional 
                                                        
1  Many thanks to two anonymous reviewers for comments and special thanks for RA support to Pui Yan Wong, Henrique 
Conca Bussacos, Nicki Goh and Rich Mallet. 
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aid’ (resource transfer) is no longer relevant and global poverty is now about 
equity/inclusion/exclusion, advocacy coalitions and beyond ‘traditional aid’ (meaning resource 
transfers).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a reprise of the data and the shift in the 
distribution of global poverty. Section 3 discusses the implications for external actors. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
Changes in the distribution of global 
poverty: A reprise  
In 1990, 93 per cent of the world’s poor people lived in LICs. Now, more than 70 per cent – up to 
a billion of the world’s poorest people or a ‘new bottom billion’ – live in MICs (and most of them in 
stable, non-fragile middle-income countries) (see Table 1). Furthermore, and contrary to earlier 
estimates that a third of the world’s poor live in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), based 
on data from the early 2000s (Branchflower et al. 2004), a ‘ball-park’ estimate, taking the broad 
FCAS definition of 43 countries from combining the Fragile States lists, is that in 2007 about 23 
per cent of poor people lived in FCAS and these were split fairly evenly between fragile LICs and 
fragile MICs. This is consistent with the new estimate of Chandy and Gertz (2011: 10) that 20 per 
cent of the world’s poor live in FCAS.  
In short, many of the world’s poor people live in countries that have got richer in average per 
capita terms and have been subsequently been reclassified as MICs. After rising considerably in 
the 1990s, the total number of LICs has fallen significantly since FY2000. According to the Atlas 
GNI per capita data and country classifications (for World Bank FY2011), over the last decade 
the number of LICs fell from 63 to just 35 countries in FY2011. Most of the world’s poor live in 
countries that have moved from low- to middle-income country status since 1999 when China 
graduated to MIC status – notably Pakistan (2008), India (2007), Nigeria (2008), and Indonesia 
(2003) (henceforth, with China, the PINCIs). China is now an Upper MIC as of July 2011. This 
concentration of the world’s poor people in relatively few countries is a key part of the story. 
Although 28 countries have transitioned from LIC to MIC since 2000, about 60 per cent of the 
world’s poor now live in just five populous new MIC countries – the PINCIs noted above. Indeed, 
of the top ten countries by contribution to global poverty only four are LICs – Bangladesh, DRC, 
Tanzania and Ethiopia.  
In sum, most of the world’s poor do not live in countries classified by the World Bank as LICs and 
most of the world’s poor do not live in FCAS. 
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Table 1 Global distribution of world poverty (% of world’s poor, US$1.25), 
1990 vs 2007 
 
 Author’s estimates based on PovCal 
(World Bank, 2011b, Adjusted base 
years) 
 
 1990 2007 
 
East Asia and Pacific 49.0 16.6 
of which China as % world poverty 38.9 9.6 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.3 1.7 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.4 2.3 
Middle East and North Africa 0.5 0.9 
South Asia 33.6 47.5 
of which India as % world poverty 25.1 38.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.3 31.1 
Total 100.1 100.1 
   
Low-income Countries (LICs)  93.1 29.1 
Middle-income Countries (MICs) 6.9 70.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Low-income, non-FCAS - 16.5 
Low-income, FCAS - 12.6 
Middle-income, non-FCAS - 60.4 
Middle-income, FCAS - 10.5 
Total - 100.0 
FCAS Total (43 in 2008) - 23.1 
China and India 64.1 47.6 
MICs minus China - 61.3 
MICs minus India - 32.9 
MICs minus China and India - 23.3 
LICs minus China 54.1 - 
LICs minus India 68.0 - 
LICs minus China and India 29.0 - 
   
PINCIs  76.4 60.2 
LICs minus PINCIs 16.7 - 
MICs minus PINCIs - 10.7 
Sources: Author’s estimates presented in Sumner (2011a) and processed from PovCal Net (World Bank 2011a); totals may not 
add up to 100% due to rounding; FCAS (Fragile and Conflict-Affected States) definition = 43 countries of combined three lists as 
per OECD (2010); LIC/MIC status is based on World Bank country classifications; PINCIs = Pakistan; India; Nigeria; China and 
Indonesia. 
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Furthermore, this is not just a question of income poverty. One can find a similar story using other 
poverty measures (see Sumner 2010). Is the trend of concentration of world poverty in new MICs 
likely to continue? Chandy and Gertz (2011) estimate the proportion of the world’s poor in MICs 
at slightly below 70 per cent (about 66 per cent) and project that this proportion of the world’s 
poor in MICs will still be 55 per cent in 2015. This projected fall of the share of the world’s income 
poor in the MICs is based on an assumption of static inequality and thus fast-falling poverty in the 
MICs especially so in India and China. However, Kanbur and Sumner (2011) have suggested this 
may be an overly optimistic view of poverty reduction in the MICs given inequality trends in fast-
growing economies. Furthermore, the projections of Moss and Leo (2011) on GNI per capita 
suggest the number of LICs may well fall to around 20 in 2025, moving more of world poverty 
towards the MICs over time. 
So, is this just about the LIC/MIC thresholds? The LIC/MIC thresholds matter not only because 
they play a role in determining the distribution of World Bank resources but because they are also 
used in the allocation and graduation frameworks of a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. 
For example, UNICEF graduates countries at the MIC/HIC threshold, and uses a weighted 
formula for allocations based on: (i) the Atlas GNI per capita data (but not the LIC/MIC threshold); 
and (ii) the under-five child population and child mortality rates for each country (for a detailed 
discussion of exactly how the thresholds are used by UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, WFP and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria, see UNICEF 2007: 76–80). The UN category of 
‘Least Developed Country’, which has particular importance for trade preferences and other 
special treatment, is also based, in part, on the GNI per capita data and thresholds (for a detailed 
discussion see Guillaumont 2010). Further, for the decade prior to its 2010/11 Bilateral Aid 
Review, DFID allocated 90 per cent of its resources to LICs based on a ‘90/10 rule’. This was in 
turn based on the Collier and Dollar (2002) model of ‘poverty-efficient’ Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) allocation.  
The LIC/MIC thresholds are based on GNI per capita average income (exchange rate 
conversion) and have been adjusted every year for ‘international inflation’ since their 
establishment based on research.2 One could argue that thresholds set in the 1970s are worthy 
of a substantial review, particularly in light of the availability of some 40 years of new data. At a 
minimum one could ask: (i) whether the use of ‘international inflation’ ought now to include China 
and other emerging economies in its calculation; and (ii) whether the use of ‘international inflation’ 
rates for the world’s richest countries is an appropriate way to assess the LIC/MIC thresholds 
over time for the world’s poorer countries which may have had inflation rates above the 
‘international inflation’ rate. More fundamentally, one could also ask, as previously noted, whether 
the original formulae developed in the 1970s are still relevant to assessing the differences 
between countries today and, if not, what formulae would make (more) sense in terms of other 
methods such as purchasing power parity (PPP)? Alternatively, should such thresholds be 
instead (i) applied at a different level – for example, sub-national level (so poorer states in India 
would qualify); or (ii) simply discarded outright in favour of a more sophisticated way of thinking 
about development assistance and cooperation (see later discussion)?  
So, how sensitive are the findings to the thresholds? Of course, the LIC/MIC thresholds are 
arbitrary lines but how sensitive is the overall picture to those thresholds? Of the new MICs, 
several are close to the LIC/MIC threshold, notably Lesotho, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, 
                                                        
2  For more detail see Sumner (2010). According to the short history of the Bank’s classifications available on their website 
(World Bank 2011a), the actual basis for the original thresholds was established by: finding a stable relationship between a 
summary measure of wellbeing such as poverty incidence and infant mortality on the one hand and economic variables 
including per capita GNI based on the Bank’s Atlas method on the other. Based on such a relationship and the annual 
availability of the Bank’s resources, the original per capita income thresholds were established. 
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Vietnam, and Yemen. These account for 64.7m of the world’s poor. This would mean 4.8 per cent 
of the world’s poor live in countries near the LIC/MIC threshold – not significant enough to change 
the overall picture though important to recognise nonetheless. Similarly, if the slightly higher 
threshold – the ‘IDA allocation’ threshold (used for IDA resource distribution) – was used instead 
of the LIC/MIC thresholds, it would not make much difference. This is because although there are 
nine new MICs that are ‘blend’ countries (under the IDA allocation but above the MIC thresholds), 
only two – Pakistan and Vietnam – make any significant contribution to global poverty (together 
home to 55m poor people, according to unadjusted data in PovCal). To assess how sensitive 
estimates of global poverty are to thresholds, one approach that can be taken is to produce 
cumulative poverty counts for US$1.25 poverty and plot against GDP PPP per capita (see 
Sumner 2011a).  
Using this approach one can apply any threshold of GDP PPP per capita and observe the 
difference it makes to global poverty distributions. This overcomes the mismatch between the 
Atlas (exchange rate conversion) method to construct ‘poor countries’ (LIC/MIC thresholds) and 
‘poor people’ (the PPP methodology of US$1.25 poverty data). Of course, any threshold ought to 
have a solid conceptual basis (see later discussion and Sumner, 2011b, forthcoming). One could, 
for example, set thresholds based on applying the poverty lines for individuals and multiples of 
them to a country’s average income as follows:  
 Extremely LICs – countries with an average income of less than $1.25 per capita/day 
 LICs – countries with an average income of less than $2.50 pc/day 
 LMICs – countries with an average income of less than $5 pc/day 
 UMICs – countries with an average income of less than $13 pc/day (the poverty line in the 
USA) 
 HICs – countries with an average income of more than $13 pc/day (the poverty line in the 
USA) 
However, such an approach is open to the criticism that it simply replaces one set of arbitrary 
thresholds with another set, albeit a set that links to a measure of poverty. 
 So are MICs just poor countries by another name? Overall, it is evident that MICs (Lower and 
Upper MICs) have higher standards of living than LICs and are far less aid-dependent (see Table 
2). The average, population-weighted, GNI per capita – by Atlas or PPP – in LMICs is quadruple 
that of LICs; the average human development score is significantly better in LMICs compared to 
LICs (including and excluding non-income components) and the average poverty headcount 
(percentage of population) in LMICs is half that of LICs. Further, the removal of China and India 
or the PINCIs group of five countries where world poverty is concentrated (Pakistan, India, 
Nigeria, China and Indonesia) from LMICs does not make much difference to human 
development indicators for the LMICs. The removal of the PINCIs substantially reduces the 
average poverty headcount in the LMICs however. Finally, LMICs have much lower ODA 
dependency data than LICs. The removal of China and India or the PINCIs raises the aid 
dependency indicators but to levels still far lower than that of the LICs group.  
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GNI per capita (Atlas, current 
US$) 2009 494.5 2276.3 1851.4 2112.7 7480.3 
GNI per capita (PPP, current 
international $) 2009 1156.5 4703.6 3769.0 4370.0 
12494.
9 
Human Development Index 2010 0.39 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.71
Non-income HDI 2010 0.46 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.74
Poverty headcount (% 
population, US$1.25) (non-
adjusted base years) 
2000-
2007 52.4 27.1 25.4 15.6 5.2 
Net ODA received (% of GNI) 2008 12.3 0.6 1.5 2.2 0.2 
Net ODA received (% of 
gross capital formation) 2008 51.3 2.0 5.8 7.8 0.9 
Source: Data processed from World Bank (2010, 2011b); data refer to the most recent available data within that period and if 
there are no data between those periods, then that data point (for a particular country, for a particular indicator) is ignored; all 
table lines are population-weighted as follows: (sum of (indicator x country population))/total population of countries with data on 
that indicator); correlations use the most recent data in the periods stated (Atlas GNI pc, 2009; HDI 2010; Non-HDI 2010; 




Implications for external actors 
working in middle-income countries 
If we accept the proposition that most of the world’s extreme poor already live in largely non-poor 
countries, in order to meet their own objectives of reducing poverty, external development actors 
such as ‘traditional donors’ (meaning OECD countries), philanthropic foundations, governments 
and civil society will need to find new configurations of relationships (or they could decide poverty 
in MICs is not their problem). If they remain focused on extreme poverty, external development 
actors will need to continue work in the new MICs because most of the world’s poor live in MICs, 
but they will need a greater focus on issues of equity/inclusion/exclusion; working with advocacy 
groups and civil society on issues such as public spending priorities but with great sensitivity to 
the politics of doing so and recognising that development is very much ‘beyond traditional aid’ 
(meaning beyond international resource transfers). Global Public Goods (GPGs), innovative 
finance mechanisms and other ‘beyond traditional aid’ modalities will be areas where MIC 
governments, traditional donors and philanthropic foundations can work together and the policy 
coherence, in areas such as trade, of traditional donors will be more important to MIC 
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governments than aid flows. All of this will place far more importance on external actors 
understanding the political dimensions of development. 
Furthermore, in the discussion so far the emphasis has been on MICs as a grouping of similar 
countries. Within this grouping, however, there are clear differences, particularly in regards to the 
need for ODA. For example, there are ‘emerging’ powers, such as India and Indonesia that have 
little need for ODA but still have substantial poor populations. Large fragile MICs, such as Nigeria 
and Pakistan, also have large numbers of poor people and may have limited need for ODA, but 
state capacity for poverty reduction and public health programmes is a significant constraint. 
Stagnant, non-fragile MICs may need ODA to support productive capacities, including human 
capital investments in health and education, and there are also fast-growing LICs which will 
graduate to MIC status soon. This heterogeneity suggests that approaches to MICs countries will 
need to be tailored to types of MIC as well as differ from those adopted in LICs.  
 
The need for attention to equity/inclusion/exclusion issues, politics and the 
rapid expansion of the middle classes in MICs 
Inequality has moved up the policy agenda in some of the major international organisations (for 
example, UNICEF (2011) and UNDP (2011) leading the wider UN body but also the World 
Economic Forum (2011) and the International Monetary Fund (2011)). The basic case is that 
inequality matters because high inequality can inhibit growth, discourage institutional 
development towards accountable government and undermine civic and social life, leading to 
conflict, especially in multi-ethnic settings (Birdsall 2006).  
The impact of inequalities on growth has received considerable attention. For example, Berg and 
Ostry (2011) in a recent IMF paper note that high inequality impedes the sustainability of growth 
spells. This resonates with the earlier work of Cornia et al. (2004) that identified critical threshold 
levels of inequality – showing that rising inequality above a gini value of 0.45 retards GDP growth 
significantly. 
Inequality has also been linked to fragility and conflict (Cramer 2003; Stewart et al. 2011). In 
terms of poverty, as shown by the extensive review by Dercon and Shapiro (2007) of long-run 
data sets, the key explanations for escaping from poverty are largely equity-related: changes in 
economic and social assets (e.g. changes in employment, land ownership and education) and/or 
social exclusion and discrimination and/or location in remote or otherwise disadvantaged areas.  
The decline of inequality in a number of Latin American countries in particular over the last 
decade has led to a range of papers seeking to understand what development actors can do to 
reduce inequality.3 What policies are behind these changes in inequality? Birdsall et al. (2011: 
14) have argued empirically that ‘social democratic’ regimes (e.g. Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) are 
more likely to reduce inequality than ‘left populist’ ones (e.g. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela) and both are more likely to reduce inequality than non-left regimes 
(e.g. Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and perhaps Peru). They argue that this is due not only to 
more social spending but also to more progressive public spending and policies overall. It is also 
due to macroeconomic policies, especially so in the social democratic regimes. On the social 
spending side, this includes spending on cash transfers targeted at the poor in the bottom 
expenditure groups and greater increases in spending on health and education that reach the 
                                                        
3  Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2009) have observed inequality that has declined in 13 of the 17 countries with comparable trend 
data. Whilst Palma has argued that the countries in Latin America with the worst income distribution in 1985 (Brazil, Chile, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama) have reduced inequality but only by a relatively minor amount and those countries 
with lower inequality in 1985 (Uruguay, Costa Rica, Argentina and Mexico) have actually increased inequality over the last 
25 years. 
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lower and middle quintiles, as well as increases in basic services. But it also includes spending 
on education, with greater increases in spending on primary and secondary schooling than on 
public universities.  
Cornia (2010: 86) also links observed declines in income inequality in some Latin American 
countries to the election of new political regimes and ‘the changes in economic and social policies 
part of the “new Left-of-Centre Latin American model” that has been gradually taking shape 
during the past decade’.  
López-Calva and Lustig (2009) concur that improved provision of education has been a key factor 
in recent declines in inequality. More broadly, government spending on transfers became more 
progressive in the 2000s in all of these countries, which has led to improvements in health, 
nutrition and basic infrastructure as well as education: these programmes have had a significant 
impact on poverty.  
Changes in labour earnings and labour policies can play a central role in reducing inequality. In 
Brazil, Barros et al. (2009: 1) find that,  
half of the decline in labour earnings inequality was caused by an acceleration of educational 
progress, which took place in Brazil over the last decade. The other half of the decline in 
labour earnings inequality came from labour market integration. Given that the minimum 
wage sets the floor for unskilled workers’ earnings, and for social security benefits, one might 
imagine that the recent increase in the real value of the minimum wage is one of the forces 
behind the overall income inequality decline in Brazil.  
Indeed, the reproduction of inequality is narrowed down to five variables using the case of Brazil: 
father’s education; mother’s education; father’s occupation; race; and region of birth. Parental 
education is the most important circumstance affecting earnings, but the occupation of the father 
and race also play a role (Bourguignon et al. 2007).  
Cornia (2011) argues that changes in inequality have been driven by changes in the 
remuneration of production factors and changes in transfers received and taxes paid by each 
household on different income types, noting (pp2–3), ‘Generally, the bottom percentiles of 
households receive most of their incomes from unskilled labour and transfers and the top ones 
from skilled labour and capital income’. Cornia (2011) argues that income inequality rose 
between 1980 and 2000 as a result of trade, foreign direct investment and financial liberalisation 
and a rise in migration. In contrast, the fall in inequality between 2000 and 2008 in Latin America, 
for example, was due to policy interventions such as: the equalisation of the distribution of human 
capital targeted social spending; changes in tax/GDP ratios; labour markets (rising real minimum 
wages, after two decades of declines + growing number of people covered by formal contracts 
and stable average wages); macroeconomic stability and exchange rates (no financial crisis and 
low inflation and public debt); and other factors. Cornia (2010: 86) notes factors explaining the 
decline in inequality in Latin American countries (LACs), 2002–7 as follows, 
the favourable external environment of 2002–2007, the rapid regional growth of GDP during 
this period, the longer-term improvements in human capital formation and in its distribution, 
and the changes in economic and social policies part of the ‘new LOC Latin American model’ 
that has been gradually taking shape during the past decade… Other important changes that 
are less frequently emphasized in the literature were recorded starting from the mid-1990s. 
The first concerns the steady gains in educational achievements realized since the beginning 
of the 1990s by both center-right and left-of-center (LOC) regimes – both social-democratic 
and populist – and the parallel decline in many aspects of educational inequality... The 
second change is the slowdown in the growth of the labor force… Together with a faster 
growth of labor demand for unskilled workers and in the supply of skilled workers, the slower 
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increase in unskilled labor supply possibly contributed to reducing unemployment and halting 
the long-term rise in the wage premium. The third, and possibly most important, change 
concerns the shift towards democratization and the election of LOC governments. Indeed, 
during the past decade the political center of gravity of the region’s shifted with surprising 
regularity towards political regimes that place greater emphasis on distributive and social 
issues while, at the same time, avoiding the populist excesses of the 1980s.  
It is worth remembering that the amount of redistribution required to end poverty is often small in 
middle-income countries (typically less than 1 per cent of GDP – see Sumner, 2011b). Ravallion 
(2010) has argued that most countries with an average per capita income over $4,000 would 
require very small additional taxation to end poverty (as an example, Palma (2011) cites Brazil’s 
Bolsa Familia which he notes distributes US$50/month to 11 million families at a cost of about  
0.5 per cent of GDP in 2005) and Soares et al. (2011) find that due to ‘outstanding’ targeting, 
Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil, Mexico and Chile have cost less than 1 per cent of GDP 
and have accounted for 15–21 per cent of the reduction in inequality.  
In short, the capacity to redistribute may become an important issue for poverty alleviation in 
middle-income countries. Thus a better understanding of the redistributive preferences of the 
expanding middle classes in MICs will be important for all development actors. 
Despite differences in defining the middle classes, general trends suggest that the middle class 
(or at least those who are not extremely poor and not wealthy) has been expanding, especially so 
in MICs, and will continue to do so in the coming decades assuming growth continues. AfDB 
(2011) and ADB (2010) with the definition of $2–$20/day per capita income, respectively estimate 
the African middle class to be 313m or 1 in 3 (34 per cent) of Africans and the developing Asian 
middle classes to be at least 1.9bn or 56 per cent of the population of developing Asia. The 
growth in the size of the middle class is largely driven by a number of Asian countries whose 
populations are graduating out of poverty and into the middle classes. However, it is much wider 
than just India and China.  
OECD (2011) discusses in some considerable detail this issue of middle-class preferences for 
the amount and type of income redistribution and redistributive fiscal policy. It notes that if public 
services are of low quality, the middle classes are more likely to consider themselves a loser in 
the fiscal bargain and less willing to contribute to financing the public sector. Other factors that 
determine preferences in redistribution are noted from the literature, including: personal 
experiences of social mobility; national and regional cultural and social values; the extent of 
impacts of (higher) taxation on leisure consumption; levels of university education; and attitudes 
to prevailing levels of meritocracy. Support for redistribution is undermined by low institutional 
capacity in tax administration and the quality of state services and pessimistic views about social 
mobility.  
All of the above would suggest that the policy levers for tackling poverty and inequality are clear 
enough and include addressing more structural and institutional factors such as setting minimum 
wages, and increasing the level and progressive weighting of social spending, notably through 
cash transfers. However, building and understanding middle-class political support (or lack of it) 




Table 3 Comparable estimates of the size of the middle classes  
($2–$20/day, household survey data) 
 
 Millions % of population 
 1990 2000 2005–9 1990 2000 2005–9 
Africa 151.4 196.3 313.3 27.0 27.2 34.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 66.0  129.9 24  33 
Developing Asia       
East Asia and Pacific 565.3  1894.9 21.0  56.0 
China    40.4 71.3 89.1 
India   274.1   24.6 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
250.2  349.7 71.0  77.0 
Sources: AfDB (2011: 21), ADB (2010: 6). 
 
Working with advocacy groups and civil society on issues of equity/ 
inclusion/exclusion in MICs 
Given the above, working with advocacy groups and civil society actors to influence policy on 
matters such as public spending priorities is one avenue through which external development 
actors can pursue their aims of poverty reduction. Within most if not all countries, there are 
various actors and organisations pushing for progressive change (however defined). We can 
note, for example, civil society organisations (CSOs), women’s organisations, social movements, 
workers’ unions, rights-based organisations and independent media as all playing important roles 
in the mission to promote progressive agendas. But what role can external development actors 
play in supporting these elements of civil society? There is little point in pretending that this does 
not cross over into the political domain – indeed, this constitutes an explicitly political approach 
infused with liberal values. For example, Hearn (1999) finds that CSOs committed to the 
promotion of liberal democracy and economic liberalism are the most popular with donors. Yet 
donors also link into global citizenship movements, underpinned by universal human rights. As 
Eyben et al. (2004: 24–25) point out, tensions within aid relationships appear to be particularly 
striking in middle-income countries: ‘many of the larger MICs have more complex and diverse 
institutions both within and outside government and donors can find themselves involved in 
internal political conflicts through the choice of whom they decide to associate with’.  
On this approach, there is a considerable body of literature on civil society in developing 
countries to draw upon (see, for example, Frantz 1987; Hadenius and Uggla 1996; Howell and 
Pearce 2000; Robinson 1995), as well as the ‘drivers of change’ approach and numerous case 
studies (see for discussion DFID 2005; OECD-DAC 2005; Moore 2001; Warrener 2004). 
And, of course, efforts to support Southern-based CSOs are not new. For example, Howell and 
Pearce (2000: 75) remarked more than a decade ago that there was considerable funding for 
projects to strengthen CSOs in developing countries. In addition, strengthening and increasing 
the visibility of civil society in policymaking processes was a core element of PRSPs (Molenaers 
and Renard 2002).  
Given the new context of high MIC poverty levels, how can external development actors use and 
adapt existing frameworks for engagement with civil society? Howell (2000: 7) outlines three 
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broad approaches that donors have traditionally adopted in order to support and develop civil 
society: institution and capacity building; partnerships and coalitions; and financial sustainability. 
In practice, she explains, these approaches are not clear-cut and tend to overlap. The third donor 
approach outlined above by Howell – (ensuring) financial sustainability – highlights the 
importance of the material bases of CSOs and other organisations. The performance and impact 
of many, if not most, CSOs tend to be constrained by insufficient resources (e.g. money, time). 
And as Howell (2000: 8) points out, the opportunities for Southern-based NGOs and CSOs to 
fundraise domestically are limited due to their countries’ high poverty levels and low levels of 
economic development. 
There are, of course, numerous, potential problems associated with externally funded CSOs. For 
example, to what degree will external assistance influence or manipulate an organisation’s 
political agenda? Do CSOs risk having their views and actions delegitimised by accepting foreign 
assistance? Robinson and Friedman (2007) investigate how far external donor funding influences 
the policy engagement and outcomes of a selection of CSOs in Uganda and South Africa. 
Regarding the South African CSOs, they find that the source of funding, whether internally 
generated or externally supplied, does not seem to be a significant factor in explaining their 
differential policy impact (Robinson and Friedman, 2007: 659). Further, they find that one CSO in 
particular receives 90 per cent of its funding from foreign sources, but manages to maintain a 
high degree of independence in framing agendas whilst significantly contributing to public policy 
(Robinson and Friedman 2007: 660). Meanwhile, in Uganda they report a more mixed set of 
results. For example, one organisation has experienced internal ideological and factional 
divisions and had its viability and independence undermined by its reliance on foreign aid. 
Additionally, it is argued that one CSO’s limited contribution to national policy debate cannot be 
explained by its dependence on donor funds (Robinson and Friedman 2007: 661). In conclusion, 
they claim that, 
Foreign aid is not the most critical determination of successful policy engagement; the 
character of a particular organization and its specific relationship to the state are decisive. But 
resources do matter, since the least effective organizations in terms of policy engagement… 
are also the least well-endowed financially. 
(Robinson and Friedman 2007: 663) 
In terms of funding CSOs, Robinson and Friedman (2007: 665) suggest four measures donors 
can take to strengthen the organisational capacity of CSOs: replace short-term project support 
with long-term program grants and technical assistance; provide specialised assistance aimed at 
strengthening capacity for policy analysis and advocacy; encourage the adoption of strategies 
designed to identify and institutionalise local sources of funding; and encourage governments to 
remove restrictive controls and simplify NGO registration procedures, thus promoting a more 
supportive policy environment for CSOs. Their third proposed measure is consistent with Aldaba 
et al.’s (2000: 678) argument that one of the ways NGOs can become self-sustainable in a 
‘beyond aid scenario’ is by taking better advantage of domestic resource options. 
Donors can also engage in ‘partnership work’ in middle-income countries. Eyben et al. (2004: 14) 
describe how a very small financial investment in strengthening the relationships between a 
country’s state government, its civil society, and donors can bring about significant shifts in social 
policy. Larbi-Jones (2004), for example, points to DFID’s work on partnerships in Brazil. This also 
brings to the fore questions of positioning. As Fowler (2000a, 2000b: 595) argues, NGOs/CSOs 
in developing countries need to carve out a space for themselves. In addition, external 
development actors should think carefully about the local political economy of aid. In a study of 
aid interfaces and the role of local elites in Nicaraguan rural villages, D’Exelle (2009: 1468) finds 
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that ‘village brokerage structures, as part of the interface with aid providers, are strongly 
correlated with recurrent exclusions from aid flows’, and that the poorest are disproportionately 
affected. Pushing for political change – decentralising the brokerage structures – can thus be 
justified by its potential to reduce poverty. 
Aid to MICs might entail supporting processes that have the potential to reduce rather than 
reinforce patterns of exclusion. This involves building long-term and consistent relationships with 
selected recipient organisations with social change agendas (e.g. local NGOs, community-based 
organisations, cooperatives etc.) (Eyben et al. 2004: 14), and gaining a deeper understanding of 
context. This means that working in MICs becomes a fundamentally more political undertaking for 
external development actors and, as such, external development actors will be required to involve 
themselves more intimately with domestic political processes, something they have tended to be 
unsure about doing in the past (Eyben et al. 2004: 15). Further, such activities may not be well 
received by MIC governments who may perceive it as interference in domestic political affairs.  
 
The rapidly declining importance of aid as resource transfer to MICs and the 
prospects for global public goods, innovative finance mechanisms and other 
‘beyond aid’ modalities as focal points where MIC governments, traditional 
donors and philanthropic foundations could work together 
Aid has traditionally been seen as resource transfers of grants or concessional lending (e.g. 
OECD 2010: 2). However, the range of available aid instruments is constantly expanding and 
diversifying with the emergence of both ‘upstream’ aid products/instruments (e.g. policy 
coherence in trade, climate, migration/remittances; advocacy for and support to independent 
media and CSOs; and global public goods), as well as ‘downstream’ aid products/instruments 
(e.g. project aid or programme aid for service delivery) and completely new financing 
mechanisms that include private and public contributions in the form of various innovative finance 
mechanisms. All of this might suggest ‘aid’ is no longer the right word to describe what might 
accurately be termed ‘international cooperation’. 
Severino and Ray (2009) have argued that our conventional understanding of ODA is looking 
more and more outdated, becoming increasingly irrelevant as a tool for action. Severino and Ray 
(2009) discuss a ‘triple revolution’ in ODA in terms of goals, players and instruments (all 
mushrooming), and question the validity of the current definition of ODA (i.e. in terms of loans 
and grants from governments). Key issues of the moment, and possible future ‘game changers’, 
include: the emergence and rise of new non-DAC donors (accounting for at least 10 per cent of 
global ODA according to UN ECOSOC 2008) and other actors such as private foundations; new 
financing and delivery modalities, such as innovative finance mechanisms, and climate financing; 
and the creation of new institutions such as cash-on-delivery and output-based aid (see Birdsall 
and Savedoff 2010). In short, the very definition of what aid is and what it hopes to achieve are 
on the table for discussion, and the path is potentially set for the design of a new kind of 
development assistance which is tasked with three conceptually distinct subsets of objectives: 
first, accelerating the economic convergence of developing and industrialised countries; second, 
providing for basic human welfare (guided predominantly by the MDGs); and third, finding 
solutions for the provision and preservation of global public goods (Severino and Ray 2009: 5).  
Yet, since the 1990s, there has been an end to the state’s monopoly over development 
assistance. Not only have the size and number of major international NGOs (e.g. Oxfam) 
expanded but we have also begun to witness the emergence of a range of new actors, from 
private foundations (e.g. the Gates Foundation) and businesses (e.g. Project (RED)), to 
transnational thematic funds (e.g. GAVI). Additionally, there is now an array of different sources 
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of funding and aid channels. For example, recently, at the 2010 MDGs Summit, the Leading 
Group on Innovative Financing for Development proposed a ‘Global Solidarity Levy’ which would 
be used to finance global public goods (Giovannetti 2010: 50). 
Innovative financing mechanisms (IFMs) and climate financing are two particular areas receiving 
increasing interest both in policy and academic arenas (see, for example, de Ferranti 2006; 
Jones 2010; Ketkar and Ratha 2009; Lob-Levyt and Affolder 2006; McCoy 2009). Such initiatives 
represent a marked departure from existent and past means of development financing (e.g. ODA) 
and ‘traditional’ donor-recipient arrangements, and, in many cases, are successful at engaging 
new stakeholders and different kinds of donor networks.4  
Furthermore, GPGs are likely to be increasingly important in a world of global collective problems 
such as climate change. Traditionally, donor assistance has typically done less to supply GPGs 
(Barrett 2002). However, te Velde et al. (2002) find that donors with large aid budgets tend to be 
those that also have a larger share of GPGs in their aid portfolios. New interest in international or 
global public goods is fuelled, in part, by an understanding of globalisation and its impacts 
(Ferroni and Mody 2002). The main rationale behind providing GPGs is to regulate or 
compensate for the negative effects of global public ‘bads’, or ‘products’ which generate negative 
externalities across borders and reduce utility (Coyne and Ryan 2008: 5), such as air pollution, 
civil war and violent conflict, disease, HIV/AIDS, international terrorism, and financial shocks.  
According to Kaul et al. (1999: 2–3), GPGs must meet two key criteria. First, their benefits must 
have strong ‘publicness’ (i.e. they are characterised by non-rivalry in consumption and non-
excludability). And second, their benefits must be at least quasi-universal in terms of countries, 
people, and generations. Meanwhile, Ferroni and Mody (2002: 1) argue that international public 
goods are primarily about three things: the rules that apply across borders; the institutions that 
supervise and enforce these rules; and the benefits that accrue without distinctions between 
countries (i.e. the (quasi) universality criterion noted above). 
The provision of GPGs is particularly important not only because of the globalised nature of the 
contemporary world but also because markets do not generally have sufficient incentives or the 
ability to allocate the necessary resources to public goods (Ferroni and Mody 2002: 2). 
Governments too, when acting in isolation, are unable to provide them. GPGs can originate in 
both rich and developing countries – for example, while developing countries can contribute 
significantly towards climate change mitigation efforts, much funding for medical research, which 
feeds into health GPGs, is targeted in rich countries with the appropriate infrastructure (te Velde 
et al., 2002: 120). However, the penetration, sustainability and impact of GPGs hinge on 
negotiations and agreements at the global level. As Barrett (2002: 73) points out, GPGs cannot 
usually be supplied by governments acting unilaterally; cooperation is typically needed. 
International organisations can play a key role in helping to build these relationships through their 
ability to convene, their ability to generate and transfer knowledge, and their ability to assist 
global and regional negotiations (Ferroni 2001: 13). 
Yet Kaul et al. (1999: 450–1) argue that GPGs tend to be underprovided due to three ‘gaps’ 
within public policymaking processes: a jurisdictional gap (i.e. the discrepancy between the global 
boundaries of major policy concerns and the national boundaries of policymaking); a participation 
gap (i.e. we live in a ‘multi-actor’ world but international cooperation remains primarily 
intergovernmental); and an incentive gap (i.e. there is not a strong enough case for countries to 
                                                        
4  IFMs are incredibly diverse, ranging from airline and tobacco taxes and advance market/purchase commitments, to global 
public-private partnerships and health funds. Many adopt explicitly market-based approaches, and many attempt to 
integrate consumers and the private sector more directly in the development financing process. While expectations of IFMs 
are high (Jones 2010), robust assessments and evaluations are to date somewhat limited. 
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address their international spillovers or to cooperate on a GPG agenda). The (potential) supply of 
GPGs also takes place within an ‘anarchic legal setting’, making agreements at the international 
level difficult to thrash out (Barrett 2002: 48). Further, the successful supply of GPGs may rest on 
the resolution of conflicting interests at the national level. Combating climate change is arguably 
one of the most widely discussed examples of a GPG, but past summits and conferences (e.g. 
Kyoto) have only seen limited success. 
GPGs are particularly important with respect to the engagement of donor and philanthropic 
foundations with middle-income countries. Indeed, MICs themselves constitute key players in the 
supply of GPGs and forging and developing partnerships with MICs is increasingly important for 
global collective action. Engaging developmentally with MICs is thus seen as an end in itself (i.e. 
achieving poverty reduction in those countries), as well as a means to providing GPGs. We can 
therefore conceptualise GPGs in two ways: as a policy framework for engagement with MICs; 
and as fundamentally contingent on the actions and cooperation of MICs. Of particular relevance 
to the earlier discussion on aiding FCAS, Coyne and Ryan (2008) examine the possibility of 
foreign intervention in order to minimise global public ‘bads’ such as civil war (and the arguments 
could extend to global poverty). One could also note the parallel with the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
(R2P) in humanitarian assistance. 
MICs are also central to the supply of regional public goods (Ferroni 2001) and, indeed, to the 
supply of regional public bads. For example, Fallon et al. (2001) describe how the spillover 
effects of the East Asian crisis affected the whole global economy and Rostoski (2006: 541) 
discusses the role of regional ‘anchor countries’ and ‘locomotives’, such as China, Indonesia and 
Thailand, claiming that cooperation with such countries produces positive effects for their 
neighbours.5 
A range of IFMs have been designed and implemented already, many of which relate to GPGs or 
at least regional, cross-border instruments and international or regional collaborations. Aside from 
some of the more well-known new institutional approaches to global health, such as the GAVI 
Alliance Fund, UNITAID is an initiative financed almost solely through airline ticket solidarity 
contributions. Other examples of innovative financing include: drug donation programmes (Liese 
et al., 2010); the Millennium Vaccine Initiative, which has channelled US$1 billion in tax credits to 
corporations in order to promote delivery of existing vaccines and accelerate development of new 
vaccines for developing countries (Stansfield et al. 2002); Debt2Health (IFM Working Group 2, 
2009); and the auction of greenhouse gas emissions permits, most notably taken up by Germany 
(IFM Working Group 2, 2009). On top of these there are also initiatives such as the International 
Health Partnership Plus (IHP+), which aims to strengthen national health systems, and Global 
Health Partnerships, for instance in Rwanda, which bring together reforms in financing with 
reforms in service delivery (Sandor 2008). 
Analysts point to the potentially huge revenues – for instance, US$6–11bn from a tobacco tax in 
high-income countries (IFM Working Group 2, 2009) – as well as long-term sustainability of 
revenue flows and awareness raising. They also describe other benefits, from harmonisation of 
health systems flows (through a Health Systems Funding Platform) and increases in efficiency of 
private health sectors (through Seed Mechanisms), to double or even triple dividends associated 
                                                        
5  Regional public goods are similar to GPGs; the main difference is spatial and scalar (although of course this also entails 
working within different legal and strategic frameworks). Kanbur (2001) distinguishes three kinds of activities to pursue 
regional public goods. First, non-country-specific investments in knowledge, dialogue, research into technologies, and 
negotiation of agreements on shared standards and policy regimes. Second, inter-country mechanisms for managing 
negative cross-border externalities and/or for creating beneficial ones. And third, country-specific action to take advantage 
of the benefits created under the two modalities above. The groundwork for pursuing regional public goods has arguably 
already been laid down in the shape of regional trade blocs and regional integration schemes; working through and 
building on these could facilitate the creation of greater spillover communities. 
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with tobacco taxes and global environmental taxes (reduced number of smoking-related diseases 
and reduced carbon emissions respectively). 
Relative to the range of IFMs already in place, the number of proposed options or options in the 
pipeline is substantial. Other proposed initiatives include: procurement mechanisms whereby 
purchases of health products are pooled; mobile phone voluntary solidarity contributions; a global 
lottery endowment; and taxes on arms sales (Atkinson 2005; de Ferranti et al. 2008; Jha 2004; 
Ratha et al. 2008).6  
In sum, if most of the world’s poor live in MICs, external development actors could refocus on 
equity/inclusion/exclusion issues, working with advocacy groups and civil society to influence 
policy such as public spending priorities and with MIC governments on GPGs, innovative finance 
and other ‘beyond aid’ questions. 
 
Conclusions 
To reiterate from the introduction, the shift in the distribution of global poverty can be viewed in 
three possible ways. First, it could all be a sleight of hand – the world’s poor still live in ‘poor’ 
countries, albeit slightly less poor than before. Second, it is business as usual because there are 
limits to domestic taxation on the rich and expanding middle classes in developing countries. Or 
third, this shift could mean that a fundamental reframing of global poverty is required, ‘traditional 
aid’ (resource transfer) is no longer relevant and global poverty is now about 
equity/inclusion/exclusion, advocacy coalitions and ‘beyond traditional aid’ questions such as 
global public goods. 
If we accept that the third view will increasingly be the case in the years ahead and if external 
development actors want to reduce global poverty, they will need to work in MICs but with new 
objectives and policies and partnerships (or alternatively, focus on LICs alone and the quarter of 
the world’s poor who live in LICs). Working in MICs will inevitably lead to more political tension – 
on spending priorities, political voice, policy coherence; this will mean that external development 
actors will need more political analysis. 
The analysis of the data that world poverty is turning from an international to a national 
distribution problem, means that governance and domestic taxation and redistribution policies are 
becoming more important than ODA (and new MICs may not want development assistance of the 
traditional bilateral sort). Aid to low-income countries will still be about resource transfers and 
increasingly about fragility, conflict, and post-conflict, but this will be for a minority of countries. 
Middle-income countries are less and less likely to need or want resource transfers over time; 
instead, they will probably be more concerned with ‘policy coherence’ from traditional donors. 
MICs may be more concerned with designing favourable and coherent development policies on 
remittances and migration, trade preferences, and climate negotiations and financing, as well as 
tax havens. Further, it is unlikely that taxpayers in donor countries will be comfortable with 
resource transfers to countries that have substantial domestic resources. 
                                                        
6  Climate financing is likely to also lead to a new generation of financing mechanisms. Brown (2009) outlines five categories 
of proposals, including the auctioning of assigned amount or emission allowances (rather than distribution for free to 
‘Annex I’ domestic firms that have to comply with emissions reduction) and the creation of carbon market-based levies, 
such as the 2 per cent CDM levy mechanism which is used to raise funds for the Kyoto Protocol’s Adaption Fund. Other 
proposals include imposing levies on international maritime transport and on air travel, developing a uniform global tax on 
CO2 emissions (with a per capita exemption for least-developed countries) and the issuance of bonds on international 
markets. These proposals are all means of creating new mechanisms to generate new and additional resources for 
addressing adaptation (and some mitigation activities) that are separate from and additional to existing ODA (Brown et al. 
2010). 
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At the same time, external development actors are likely to be increasingly concerned about 
equity and governance issues – and drivers of progressive change. It is true that many middle-
income countries may be able to support their own poor people to a certain extent, but inequality 
remains an important issue. Poor people often lack a voice in governance structures, and their 
governments may lack political will, even when domestic resources are on the rise. In such 
cases, traditional donors might seek to direct their activities towards supporting inclusive policy 
processes and the media, social movements, advocacy groups and civil society organisations, 
and other drivers of change. Doing so may not be well received by MIC governments; many of 
them will be donors themselves and perhaps less interested in ‘progressive (domestic) change’ 
and more in their foreign and economic policy interests as noted above. The main area of 
agreement might be in global public goods, where interest in collective action on security, climate 
change, and other global issues is shared. The other issues could include defining global poverty 
as a global public ‘bad’ that requires collective action, although specific political and economic 
interests over who contributes and who benefits differ among countries. 
In the meantime continued donor relationships with MICs are justified on the grounds of: high 
levels of exclusion and inequality; domestic constraints (e.g. inadequate tax systems); need for 
technical expertise; and international and regional public goods. However, external development 
actors may lack financial leverage in MICs, so will need to find alternative means of supporting 
poverty reduction. This might involve engaging with civil society and NGOs. Such engagement is 
likely to be highly politically sensitive and donors will need to tread carefully, employing detailed 
understanding of political and economic conditions. External development actors will increasingly 
need to recognise that MICs have moved from being passive recipients of aid to being active 
participants in the international architecture. Indeed, many of the MICs may well be foreign aid 
donors themselves. The changing dynamic entails a need to rethink development assistance 
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